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Cooperation in Delay-Tolerant Networks With
Wireless Energy Transfer: Performance
Analysis and Optimization
Dusit Niyato, Member, IEEE, Ping Wang, Member, IEEE, Hwee-Pink Tan, Senior Member, IEEE,
Walid Saad, Member, IEEE, and Dong In Kim, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider a delay-tolerant network (DTN) whose
mobile nodes are assigned to collect packets from data sources
and deliver them to a sink (i.e., a gateway). Each mobile node
operates by using energy transferred wirelessly from the gateway.
For such a network, two main issues are studied. First, when a
mobile node is at the data source, this node must decide on whether
to accept the packet received from the data source or not. In
contrast, whenever a mobile node is at the gateway, it has to decide
on whether to transmit the packets collected from the data sources
or to request wireless energy transfer. Second, multiple mobile
nodes can cooperate and form coalitions to help one another
in the delivery of packets from their associated data sources.
However, this cooperation may not be always beneficial due to
the limited buffer and energy resources. Moreover, some mobile
nodes may secretly decide to deviate from a given coalition, thus
taking advantage of the other innocent mobile nodes. To address
these two issues, this paper introduces a performance analysis and
optimization framework, which is based on a joint optimization
and game-theoretic framework. The optimization model is used to
obtain the packet delivery policy of each individual mobile node.
Then, a novel game-theoretic model, namely a repeated coalition
formation game, is developed to analyze the cooperation strategies
of multiple mobile nodes.
Index Terms—Cooperative game, delay-tolerant network
(DTN), game theory, wireless energy transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ELAY-TOLERANT networks (DTNs) have emerged asa promising networking technology for collecting, car-
rying, and forwarding delay-insensitive data from sources to
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destinations [1], [2]. The concept of a DTN can be applied
to various applications such as sensor networks and networks
with big data volume [3], [4]. In the former, mobile nodes can
move and visit sensor nodes, collect sensing data, and then
move back and offload the data to a data sink. Similarly, in the
latter, mobile nodes travel to and download data from big data
sources. The mobile nodes subsequently travel to the desired
destinations and upload the big data. Clearly, DTNs constitute
a viable and promising solution for such applications due to
the fact that it may not be technically or economically possible
to have direct connections among sensor nodes or data sources
to sinks and destinations. For example, a sensor network could
be partially disconnected due to its limited transmission range.
In addition, it could be too expensive to transmit big data over
wireless links.
This paper considers a DTN for the aforementioned scenar-
ios. In this proposed model, we also allow the mobile nodes
to be charged wirelessly using wireless energy transfer capa-
bility. A few studies present the potential of wireless energy
transfer. There are three major approaches for wireless energy
charging/transfer, i.e., radio-frequency (RF) energy transfer,
resonant inductive coupling, and magnetic resonance coupling.
RF energy transfer is based on radiative propagation and can
achieve an efficiency value of 0.4% at −40 dBm, above 18.2%
at −20 dBm, and over 50% at −5 dBm [5]. Resonant inductive
and magnetic resonance coupling are the near-field energy
transfer with nonradiative propagation. The resonant inductive
coupling can have an efficiency value that ranges from 5.81%
to 57.2% when frequency varies from 16.2 to 508 kHz [6]. The
magnetic resonance coupling has an efficiency value that ranges
from above 90% to above 30% when distance varies from 0.75
to 2.25 m [7].
In DTNs, whenever a mobile node is present at a gateway,
it can request wireless energy transfer to replenish its battery.
This will obviate the need for physical battery charging or the
replacement of the mobile node after the depletion of its energy.
However, a number of important challenges must be addressed
in such a DTN scenario in which the nodes possess wireless
energy transfer capabilities. For instance, each mobile node
needs to optimize the schedule of its packet transmission and
wireless energy transfer, when it is at the gateway. In addition,
due to limited buffer and energy resources, the mobile nodes
must selectively collect packets from different sources. In this
model, the multiple mobile nodes can potentially help one
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another to deliver the packets from their associated data sources
to the gateway. For example, if two mobile nodes cooperate,
they can collect each other’s data from the data sources and
deliver it to the gateway. Here, due to limited resources, the
mobile nodes may not always benefit from such a cooperation.
Indeed, there is a need to devise a scheme using which the mo-
bile nodes can decide to form stable and beneficial cooperative
groups or “coalitions” such that their individual payoffs (i.e.,
packet delivery rate) are maximized.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a com-
prehensive performance analysis and optimization framework
for DTNs having wireless energy transfer capabilities. This
framework is composed of the following key components:
• Optimization model for obtaining an optimal packet deliv-
ery policy: For each individual mobile node, we formulate
a constrained Markov decision process (CMDP) to obtain
an optimal packet delivery policy. This policy maps the
queue and energy states of each mobile node to its action.
The action includes accepting or refusing a packet from
the data source and transmitting the packet or requesting
for wireless energy transfer from the gateway.
• Game-theoretic model for forming stable cooperative
coalitions: Given the packet delivery policy of each mobile
node, we formulate a cooperative game model to analyze
and derive the prospective stable coalitions that will form
between the different mobile nodes. We introduce the
novel concept of a repeated coalition formation game,
which takes into account the possible actions (deviations
and punishments) that can stabilize the coalitions between
the nodes. In this game, each mobile node optimizes not
only the instantaneous gain that results from forming or
deviating from the coalitions but also the discounted future
payoff as well (i.e., long-term payoff).
Although some works in the literature considered similar
DTN models (e.g., [8]–[19]), such works do not address the
impact of wireless energy transfer on the scheduling policy.
Moreover, none of these works studied the use of coalition
formation for the DTN, particularly from a repeated game
perspective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a review of the related literature. Section III
describes the system model. Section IV introduces the proposed
queueing model and the CMDP formulation that allows to ob-
tain an optimal packet delivery policy for an individual mobile
node. Section V develops the repeated coalition formation game
model that enables the mobile nodes to cooperate. Section VI
presents the numerical performance evaluation results. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Buffer Management in Delay-Tolerant Networks
DTNs have recently attracted a significant attention in the
literature. In essence, a majority of the existing literature has
focused on routing in DTNs (e.g., see the extensive surveys in
[1] and [2]). Additionally, buffer management [8]–[19] is yet
another important problem in DTNs, which is also related to
the topic of this paper.
In [8], Li et al. considered a delay-tolerant mobile sensor net-
work, in which a mobile node moves, collects, and delivers data
to a sink. To support data delivery service in such a network,
Li et al. in [8] introduced a queue management medium-access-
control protocol designed to allow the mobile nodes to discover
and receive data from the sources. This protocol can switch the
data source and the mobile node to a sleep mode to reduce
energy consumption. The work in [9] considered a homing-
pigeon-based DTN, in which a mobile node (i.e., a pigeon
node) is used to deliver data from a source to a destination on a
regular basis. In this paper, a scheduling scheme was developed
for buffer management at the pigeon node to minimize packet
delay. In particular, a packet that requires a small delay is
assigned a higher priority and placed at the head of the buffer.
In [10], a message ferry DTN is studied. In this scheme, a ferry
node is used to deliver data from a source to a destination. A
buffer management scheme based on a max–min fairness model
was proposed. The ferry node accepts and places data from
different sources in the buffer such that the minimum data rate
of any source is maximized.
The message delivery performance of a DTN under different
queueing management policies and message forwarding strate-
gies was evaluated in [11]. Using simulation, the work in [11]
showed that the performance of a DTN can vary significantly if
the queueing management policy and the message forwarding
strategy are not jointly optimized. In [12], Li et al. studied
a scenario in which the bandwidth and buffer space of the
nodes in a DTN are limited. To improve the performance with
such constraints, Li et al. introduced an adaptive optimal buffer
management policy. This policy exploits historical encounter
statistics and a message dropping strategy to maximize the
delivery rate or to minimize the delivery delay. Yin et al. [13]
considered an analogous problem. By adopting notions from
optimal control theory, the optimal policy to accept or drop a
packet in a DTN was introduced. The optimization problem
formulated in [13] considers delivery ratio, delay, and overhead.
Alternatively, Krifa et al. [14] proposed a distributed scheduling
and drop policy for DTN nodes. Under such a scheduling
policy, each node schedules messages to be forwarded to the
other nodes within a limited encounter time. The scheduling
approach is integrated with the drop policy to selectively accept
the messages based on available buffer space.
B. Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is another key challenge in DTNs (see,
e.g., [20]–[23]). One seminal work in this regard was presented
in [20], which analyzed the network capacity region given the
energy requirement of the network’s nodes. In [21], the duty
cycle of mobile nodes in a DTN was optimized in a way to
reduce energy consumption. This work allows multiple nodes
to cooperatively form clusters so that the nodes can coordinate
their active/inactive modes in an effort to save energy. In this
case, each active node can receive and forward messages for
other nodes in the same cluster. It is shown that the energy
consumption of the nodes can be significantly reduced, whereas
the message delivery performance is not affected. Ren and
Liang [22] studied the data collection problem by a mobile
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sink in sensor networks with energy harvesting. The optimal
trajectory for the mobile sink is defined in a way to maximize
the network throughput. While the problem of finding such an
optimal trajectory is NP-hard, a heuristic algorithm was pro-
posed, which is then shown to achieve a nearly optimal solution.
In [23], an optimal opportunistic message forwarding policy in
an energy-limited DTN was considered. This policy is defined
as the probability of forwarding a message. Both the static and
dynamic policies are derived when the nodes do not have or
have the time information of the message (e.g., waiting time),
respectively. In [24], a cooperative game model was studied
to evaluate the core capacity region of an energy-constrained
DTN. When the nodes cooperate to carry and forward each
other’s messages, the capacity gains can be quantified from the
cooperation. However, this work assumes an ideal cooperation
and does not consider the formation of coalitions between the
nodes for the practical scenario in which not all the nodes can
benefit from cooperation due to limited resources. Additionally,
to the best of our knowledge, no existing work has considered
the optimal data forwarding policy based on the energy state of
a mobile node.
A number of existing works have considered wireless energy
transfer as a means to support sensor networks. The main idea
is to use a mobile charging device to carry energy received
from fixed charging stations and to supply this energy to sensor
nodes. For example, Li et al. [25] introduced a “Qi-Ferry”
unit, which is powered by electric energy to carry energy and
move around a wireless sensor network. The Qi-Ferry receives
energy via wireless energy transfer from an energy station. The
Qi-Ferry then visits sensor nodes to wirelessly supply energy,
thus extending the sensors’ lifetime. An optimization problem
was formulated to obtain the charging strategy of the Qi-Ferry
unit to maximize the number of sensors that can be charged
while meeting the constraint on the energy usage. In [26],
Xie et al. considered a similar scenario in which a mobile
charging unit periodically moves and charges sensor nodes
wirelessly. In [26], an optimization problem is introduced to
maximize the ratio between the vacant time of the mobile
charging unit over the total time. This optimization problem
is solved to obtain the optimal traveling path for each mobile
charging unit. The wireless power charger placement problem
was studied in [27] using an integer linear programming (LP)
model. The objective is to maximize the number of sensor
nodes receiving wireless energy from the charger.
However, none of these existing works has considered the
data delivery or sensor data collection using mobile nodes in
a DTN with wireless energy transfer capability as proposed
here. Moreover, these works considered an individual mobile
charging unit only, thus ignoring the possibility of cooperation
between multiple nodes.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Delay-Tolerant Network With Wireless Energy Transfer
Consider a single-hop DTN that provides a data delivery
service from data sources to a gateway using mobile nodes.
This model is similar to the homing-pigeon-based DTN [9] or
Fig. 1. Gateway, mobile node, and data source.
the message ferry DTN [10]. In particular, each mobile node
moves between the data source and gateway. Without loss of
generality, each mobile node is associated with a data source.
Therefore, we use the same variable to denote a mobile node
and a gateway (e.g., mobile node i delivers packets from source
i to the gateway). In this network, we consider the possibility
of having wireless energy transfer. In this respect, each mobile
node i has a data queue (i.e., buffer) of size Qi packets and an
energy storage device (i.e., battery) of size Bi units of energy.
Depending on its connectivity, each mobile node can take a
different action (see Fig. 1), as follows.
• When a mobile node is at the gateway, it can request a
wireless energy transfer or a data transmission. Here, only
one of these two actions can be chosen at a time. This
is due to the fact that each mobile node uses the same
antenna unit for both data transmission and wireless en-
ergy reception. For instance, if the mobile node requests a
wireless energy transfer, the gateway will transfer wireless
energy, and mobile node i can receive Ki units of energy.
Alternatively, the mobile node can decide to transmit the
packet in its data queue to the gateway. We use μi to denote
the successful packet transmission probability. Moreover,
the packet transmission by the mobile node consumes Ji
units of energy.
• When a mobile node is at the data source, it can make
a decision on whether to receive a packet from the data
source or not. If not, the mobile node remains idle and
consumes no energy (e.g., it switches to a sleep mode).
Otherwise, it will consume Jˆi units of energy for packet
reception. Note that, in some scenarios, a mobile node
can transfer this energy to the data source, which can use
this energy for sending data to the mobile node. This is
similar to an RFID network, where a reader sends energy
to an RFID tag so that the tag can send data back to
the reader. The packet generation probability of a data
source i is denoted by αi. The probability of successful
packet transmission from the data source to the mobile
node is denoted by μˆi.
Although a mobile node is assigned to collect packets from
a particular data source, it can move around and visit other
data sources, which are associated with other mobile nodes. Let
N denote the set of all mobile nodes, where N = |N | is the
total number of all mobile nodes. Fig. 2 shows the considered
scenario. In this figure, there are three data sources and three
mobile nodes (i.e., N = {1, 2, 3}). Each mobile node can visit
any data sources. Note that the mobile nodes can also return to
any gateway. In this network, the mobile nodes can cooperate
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Fig. 2. System model of a DTN with data and energy transfer.
to assist one another in collecting data packets from the data
sources associated with other mobile nodes. Such a cooperation
may or may not improve the packet delivery rates from the
data sources. Therefore, to analyze the packet delivery rates
of the mobile nodes with wireless energy transfer, we will
propose a performance analysis and optimization framework
that considers not only the packet delivery policy of each
mobile node but also the cooperation strategies of all the mobile
nodes in the network.
The mobility of every mobile node is modeled via a transition
probability m(i)l,l′ , which is the probability that node i moves
from location l to l′. Let LG be the set of all locations that have
a gateway and LS be the set of all locations that have a data
source. Location li ∈ LS has a data source i. We assume that
the data sources are not located at the same locations as any
of the gateways, i.e., LG ∩ LS = ∅. In other words, the data
sources are not in the coverage of any gateway. The mobility
matrix of a given mobile node i is denoted by M(i), whose
elements are m(i)l,l′ .
B. Performance Analysis and Optimization
For the considered DTN model with wireless energy transfer,
we introduce a novel framework to analyze the performance of
the data delivery service provided by the mobile nodes from
the data sources to the gateways. The framework is composed
of 1) an optimization model based on a CMDP that allows to
determine an optimal packet delivery policy of each individual
mobile node and 2) a game-theoretic model based on a repeated
coalition formation game that allows to analyze the cooperation
strategy of multiple mobile nodes for data delivery. Here, a
coalition is defined as a set of mobile nodes (e.g., S ⊆ N ) that
cooperate and agree to help collect the packets from the data
sources of other nodes in the same coalition and subsequently
deliver those packets to a gateway.
The optimization model for a packet delivery policy and
game-theoretic model for the cooperation strategy are interre-
lated. The optimization model utilizes the coalition information
from the game-theoretic model to determine the optimal packet
delivery policy. The game-theoretic model uses the packet
delivery rate as a payoff to determine the best cooperation
Fig. 3. Performance analysis and optimization framework for the DTN with
wireless energy transfer capability.
strategy. Fig. 3 shows the components in the framework and
their relations.
IV. WIRELESS ENERGY TRANSFER
AND DATA TRANSMISSION
Here, we present the CMDP formulation that allows to obtain
the optimal packet delivery policy of a particular mobile node
i (i.e., the mobile node i tagged in the performance analysis
and optimization). This mobile node i can cooperate with other
nodes whose coalition is denoted S . The coalition can be a
singleton coalition (i.e., S = {i}). However, a coalition cannot
be empty (i.e., S = ∅) as each tagged mobile node can at
least form a singleton coalition on its own. We first define the
state space and action space. Then, we present the optimization
formulation. Based on the optimal policy, we derive the impor-
tant performance measures. Appendix A presents the detailed
derivation of the transition probability matrix of the CMDP.
A. State Space and Action Space
We consider a tagged mobile node. For ease of presentation,
we omit the subscript i of the mobile node. The state space of a
mobile node is defined as follows:
Θ = {(L,BQ);L ∈ L,B ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B}
Q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Q}} (1)
where L, B, and Q represent, respectively, the location, the
energy level (i.e., energy state) of the energy storage, and the
number of packets in the data queue of the mobile node. B is
the size of the energy storage, Q is the maximum queue size
of the node, and L is the set of all locations. The state is then
defined as a composite variable θ = (l, b, q) ∈ Θ, where l, b,
and q are the location, the energy state, and the number of
packets in the data queue, respectively.
The action space of a mobile node can be defined as Ω =
{0, 1, 2, 3}, where 0, 1, 2, and 3 are defined as follows.
• “0”: The mobile node remains idle and does nothing.
• “1”: The mobile node requests wireless energy transfer
from the gateway. This action can be taken only if the node
is located at the gateway.
• “2”: The mobile node transmits a packet to the gateway.
This action can be taken only if the node is located at the
gateway.
3744 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 64, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015
• “3”: The mobile node receives a packet from the data
source. This action can be taken only if the node is located
at a particular data source.
B. Optimization Formulation
Given the state and action spaces, we formulate a CMDP
optimization model to obtain an optimal packet delivery policy
for each mobile node as follows:
max
π
JR(π) (2)
s.t. JL,i′(π) ≤ Li′ , i′ ∈ S (3)
where JR(π) and JL,i′(π) are, respectively, the steady-state
packet delivery rate of the mobile node and the packet block-
ing probability of source i′, which is a member of the same
coalition as mobile node i. π is the packet delivery policy of
the mobile node, and Li′ is the packet blocking probability
threshold for source i′ that must be guaranteed by mobile
node i. In other words, mobile node i aims to maximize the
packet delivery rate given that its packet blocking probability
at source i′ is maintained below the threshold. The steady-state
performance metrics can be defined as follows:
JR = lim
t→∞ inf
1
t
t∑
t′=1
E (R(θt′ , ωt′)) (4)
JL,i′ = lim
t→∞ sup
1
t
t∑
t′=1
E (Li′(θt′ , ωt′)) (5)
where θt′ ∈ Θ and ωt′ ∈ Ω are the state and action variables,
respectively, for the mobile node at time t′. R(·) and Li′(·)
are functions of the immediate packet delivery rate and the
immediate packet blocking probability, respectively.
The immediate packet delivery rate is expressed by
R(θ, ω) =
⎧⎨
⎩
μ, (l ∈ LG) and (q > 0)
and (b ≥ J) and (ω = 2)
0, otherwise
(6)
where θ = (l, b, q) is a composite state variable. In (6), the
immediate packet delivery rate is the successful packet trans-
mission probability in the case where 1) the mobile node is with
any gateway (i.e., l ∈ LG); or 2) its data queue is not empty
(i.e., q > 0); 3) the energy level in the energy storage is larger
than or equal to the amount required for transmitting a packet
(i.e., b ≥ J); and 4) the mobile node decides to transmit the
packet (i.e., ω = 2).
The immediate packet blocking probability is given by
Li′(θ, ω) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1, (l = i′) and
(
(b < Jˆ) or (q = Q)
or (ω = 3))
0, otherwise.
(7)
A packet is blocked if a mobile node is with the data source
i′, but 1) this mobile node does not have enough energy in its
storage to receive a packet (i.e., b < Jˆ); or 2) its data queue is
full (i.e., q = Q); or 3) the mobile node decides not to receive
the packet (i.e., ω = 3).
To solve for an optimal packet delivery policy, we follow
the standard method of a randomized policy [28]. The optimal
randomized policy is denoted by π∗(θ, ω) for θ ∈ Θ and ω ∈
Ω, which is the probability of taking an action ω when the
current state of the node is θ. We first transform the CMDP
optimization model into an LP model. Then, we solve for the
optimal solution of this LP model, which can be mapped to the
optimal randomized policy of the CMDP model. Let φ(θ, ω) be
the stationary probability of state θ and action ω. The equivalent
LP model can be expressed as follows:
max
φ(θ,ω)
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
ω∈Ω
φ(θ, ω)R(θ, ω) (8)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
ω∈Ω
φ(θ, ω)Li′(θ, ω) ≤ Li′ i′ ∈ S (9)
φ(θ, ω = 3) = 0, for (l ∈ LG) (10)
φ(θ, ω = 1) = 0, φ(θ, ω = 2) = 0
for (l ∈ L \ LG) (11)∑
ω∈Ω
φ(θ′, ω) =
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
ω∈Ω
φ(θ, ω)Pθ,θ′(ω)
θ′ ∈ Θ (12)∑
θ∈Θ
∑
ω∈Ω
φ(θ, ω) = 1, φ(θ, ω) ≥ 0 (13)
where Pθ,θ′(ω) is the element of the transition probability ma-
trix P(ω), with θ = (s, b, q) and θ′ = (s′, b′, q′). Appendix A
presents the detailed derivation of matrix P(ω). Pθ,θ′(ω) is the
probability that the action ω is taken and the state changes from
θ to θ′.
• The objective in (8) is to maximize the packet delivery
rate.
• The constraint in (9) allows to maintain the packet block-
ing probability below a desired threshold.
• The constraint in (10) indicates that a mobile node cannot
receive a packet when it is at a location having a gateway.
• The constraint in (11) indicates that a mobile node cannot
request a wireless energy transfer or transmit a packet if it
is at a location without a gateway.
• The constraint in (12) satisfies the Chapman–Kolmogorov
equation.
A standard LP solver can be applied to obtain the solution
φ∗(θ, ω) of the problem in (8)–(13).
The optimal randomized policy of the mobile node can
be derived from the optimal solution of the LP model, i.e.,
φ∗(θ, ω), as follows:
π∗(θ, ω) =
φ∗(θ, ω)∑
ω′∈Ω φ∗(θ, ω′)
(14)
for θ ∈ Θ and ∑ω′∈Ω φ∗(θ, ω′) > 0. If ∑ω′∈Ω φ∗(θ, ω′) = 0,
then π∗(θ, 0) = 1 (i.e., the mobile node will do nothing).
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C. Performance Measures
Given that the CMDP is feasible, we can obtain the optimal
policy of a given mobile node. The major metric used to
characterize the performance of a mobile node is the packet
delivery rate (i.e., the number of packets successfully delivered
to a gateway per unit time). Here, we assume that whenever the
mobile node receives packets from any source, it will deliver
these packets to the gateway. In other words, there is no loss
during the packet delivery by the mobile node. If a wireless
transmission error occurs, the mobile node will retransmit the
packets until they are received successfully by the gateway.
Therefore, the packet delivery rate of a source i′ serviced by
a mobile node i is the rate at which mobile node i accepts the
packets from source i′, i.e.,
τii′(S) = νi,li′αi′ μˆi′
⎛
⎝ B∑
b=Jˆi
Q−1∑
q=0
φ∗i (θ, ω = 3)
⎞
⎠ (15)
for i, i′ ∈ S , where νi,li′ is the probability that mobile node i
will be at the location li′ . φ∗i (θ, ω) is the steady-state probability
of taking action ω at state θ with the optimal policy for mobile
node i. Let 	ν(i) denote a vector of νi,li′ . This vector can be
obtained by solving the following equations: (	ν(i))

M(i) =
(	ν(i))

and (	ν(i))
	1 = 1, where 	1 is a vector of ones with
an appropriate size. In (15), νi,li′αi′ μˆi′ accounts for the packet
arrival rate at mobile node i, while
∑B
b=Jˆi
∑Q−1
q=0 φ
∗
i (θ, ω = 3)
accounts for the case in which the mobile node has enough
energy, the data queue is not full, and the action is to accept the
packet from data source i′. Again, a mobile node can cooperate
and form a coalition with other nodes to help in and receive help
for packet delivery. Therefore, the total packet delivery rate of
mobile node i, which is a member of coalition S , is given by
τmi =
∑
i′∈S
τii′(S). (16)
Additionally, the total packet delivery rate of a data source i is
obtained from
τsi =
∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S). (17)
Note that the difference between τmi in (16) and τsi in (17)
is that τmi is the total packet delivery rate of mobile node i
for all the data sources associated with the mobile nodes that
cooperate (i.e., in the same coalition) with i. In contrast, τsi
is the total packet delivery rate for a particular source i by all
mobile nodes in the same coalition with mobile node i. In other
words, τsi is the total gain/benefit reaped by mobile node i when
it cooperates and forms a coalition with other nodes (i.e., so that
the other nodes deliver packets for source i). This total packet
delivery rate will be used as the payoff that captures the benefits
from cooperation and coalition formation. The details of the
coalition formation process will be discussed in Section V.
The average delivery delay can be analyzed using Little’s
law. First, the average number of packets in the data queue of
the mobile node i is obtained from
q =
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
l∈L
B∑
b=0
Q∑
q=0
qφ∗i (θ, ω). (18)
The average delivery delay is obtained from
d =
q
τmi
. (19)
In this case, the effective packet arrival (if the packet is ac-
cepted and queued) is equal to the delivery rate. Therefore, the
denominator in (19) is the total packet delivery rate of mobile
node i.
The average energy consumption of mobile node i is
ei =
∑
l∈L
B∑
b=0
Q∑
q=0
∑
ω=1
φ∗i (θ, ω). (20)
V. MOBILE NODES’ COOPERATION
Here, we consider the cooperation possibilities between the
mobile nodes that seek to cooperatively deliver the packets that
they receive from data sources. We introduce a novel repeated
coalition formation game concept, which considers the long-
term cooperation strategies of the mobile nodes. We first present
an example scenario. Then, we introduce the formulation of the
repeated coalition formation game. Next, we discuss about the
notions of stable coalitions and the stochastic model used to
analyze the repeated coalition formation game.
A. Example
As the mobile nodes visit the data sources opportunistically,
they can help each other by accepting packets from the data
sources associated with other nodes and subsequently forward-
ing these packets to the gateway. Although this cooperation may
improve the packet delivery rate reciprocally, a mobile node has
to spend additional resources (i.e., a space in the data queue
and energy for packet reception and transmission) to deliver the
packets of other data sources. Therefore, if a mobile node does
not gain much from cooperation compared with the associated
resource consumption, it will decide not to help other nodes and
will eventually act alone in delivering packets from its own data
source.
Consider the following example. There are two mobile
nodes, each of which is associated with its own data source, i.e.,
1 and 2. The same parameter setting as given in Section VI-A
is used.
• When each mobile node acts alone as a singleton coalition
(i.e., {1} and {2}), the packet delivery rate for each
data source by each mobile node is τ11({1}) = τs1 =
τ22({2}) = τs2 = 2.392 × 10−3.
• If these two mobile nodes cooperate and form a single
coalition S = {1, 2} to cooperatively deliver packets from
their data sources, the total delivery rate for each source
will be τs1 = τs2 = 4.355 × 10−3. This is found from τs1 =
τ11({1, 2}) + τ21({1, 2}) (i.e., sum of the delivery rates
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of mobile nodes 1 and 2 accepting packets from source
1). Similarly, we have, for source 2, τs2 = τ12({1, 2}) +
τ22({1, 2}).
Clearly, forming a coalition between mobile nodes 1 and 2
yields higher packet delivery rate for each source. However, if
mobile node 1 is selfish and secretly deviates from the coalition
(i.e., this mobile node does not deliver the packets received
from the data source 2 without informing mobile node 2), the
packet delivery rate of data source 1 will become τs1 = 4.570 ×
10−3, where τs1 = τ11({1}) + τ21({1, 2}). This delivery rate
of source 1 when mobile node 1 deviates from the coalition
is larger than the one it achieves if it remains in the coalition.
This follows from the fact that mobile node 1 does not need to
spend its resource for delivering the packets from data source
2 (i.e., τ11({1})). However, in this scenario, mobile node 2
may still unwittingly help deliver the packets from data source
1 (i.e., τ21({1, 2})). In this case, data source 2 is a victim of
the deviation by mobile node 1 and its packet delivery rate is
just τs2 = τ22({1, 2}) = 2.177 × 10−3. Therefore, there is an
incentive for a mobile node to deviate as it can achieve a higher
packet delivery rate. Based on this example, the payoff matrix
of mobile nodes 1 and 2 can be expressed as in (21), shown at
the bottom of the page.
This scenario can be viewed as a static noncooperative
game [29]. In particular, the matrix game shown in (21) for
mobile nodes 1 and 2 may have a pair of stable strategies
(i.e., deviate–deviate). That is, none of the nodes is willing to
form a coalition. However, if the mobile nodes consider a long-
term payoff (i.e., over multiple time periods), the coalition can
be stabilized. In what follows, we will formally formulate a
novel repeated coalition formation game to study the long-term
cooperation strategies of the mobile nodes to deliver packets
from data sources in the considered DTN.
B. Repeated Coalition Formation
We develop a repeated coalition formation game based on
a classical coalition formation game [29]. In this game, the
players are mobile nodes whose set is given by N . The repeated
coalition formation game is formulated with nontransferable
utility (NTU). Here, the game has NTU since the packet de-
livery rate cannot be divided arbitrarily. Let N (i.e., the set
of all players) be the grand coalition formed by all players.
The payoff of player i is defined as the total discounted packet
delivery rate from source i over time, i.e.,
xi(S) = (1 − δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtτsi (S, t) (22)
for i ∈ S , where δ (0 < δ < 1) is the discount factor, and
τsi (S, t) is the total packet delivery rate from source i at time
period t. This rate is obtained from (17). τsi (S, t) could be
interpreted as the instantaneous payoff (i.e., the payoff used in a
classical coalition formation game), whereas xi(S) is the long-
term payoff.
The players (i.e., mobile nodes) will decide on whether to
form coalitions based on their long-term payoffs xi(S), ∀i ∈
N . The players can cooperate and form a coalition if the long-
term payoff is higher than the one received when acting alone.
However, without any commitment, a selfish player i′ can
deviate from a given coalition S . This deviating player i′ will
take advantage of the other innocent players who believe that
the deviating player i′ is still in the coalition S . These innocent
players will deliver the packets from the source of deviating
player i′ in the following time period. Then, after detecting the
deviation in the following period, the innocent players will stop
delivering the packets from the source i′.
In a repeated game context, such a deviating player can
be punished. That is, the players in the coalition will not
allow the deviating player to join the coalition again forever.
This is referred to as the trigger punishment scheme, which
can deter deviations by any player and stabilize the coalition.
However, this trigger punishment scheme may not be efficient
or necessary. In this scheme, if the deviating player is punished,
the deviating player and other players in the coalition will not
get help in packet delivery forever, which will adversely affect
the long-term payoff. Therefore, we consider a punish-and-
forgive scheme. In this scheme, a player may deviate from
the coalition. However, if the other players in the coalition
detect the deviation, they will enter the punishment stage. The
detection of a deviation can be done by checking whether any of
the coalition members is helping to deliver packets in a certain
period or not. In the punishment stage, the players will not
let the deviating player join the coalition again for T − 1 time
periods, where T is referred to as the punishment duration. If T
is large, the punishment is severe, and the player will be less
likely to deviate. However, this will be at the cost of lower
long-term payoff since there will be a longer period for the
punishment stage. Then, after the punishment period is over,
the deviating player can be allowed to join the coalition again.
C. Stable Coalition
In the following, we consider the stability of a coalition S .
A coalition is said to be stable if it is internally and externally
stable. We define the internal and external stability as follows.
• Internal stability: A coalition S is internally stable if no
mobile node can obtain a higher long-term payoff by
deviating from coalition S .
Cooperate Deviate
Cooperate (4.355 × 10−3, 4.355 × 10−3) (2.177 × 10−3, 4.570 × 10−3)
Deviate (4.570 × 10−3, 2.177 × 10−3) (2.392 × 10−3, 2.392 × 10−3)
(21)
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• External stability: A coalition S is externally stable if
it cannot merge with another coalition S′ while yielding
higher long-term payoffs for all players in the new coali-
tion S ∪ S′.
For internal stability, we assume that one player can deviate
at a time. Therefore, the condition for internal stability is that
xi(S) > xi({i}) for all i ∈ S . That is, the long-term payoff
xi(S) of all the players in a coalition S must be strictly larger
than the one achieved if any player deviates and acts alone
xi({i}). The long-term payoff of a player i when this player
i and other players are members of coalition S is given by
xi(S) = (1 − δ)
〈 ∞∑
t=0
δt
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)〉
=
∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S) (23)
where we assume that the packet delivery rate τi′i(S) is
identical at all time periods.
∑
i′∈S τi′i(S) is the total packet
delivery rate of source i, which is the instantaneous payoff of
player i.
If player i deviates from coalition S at time period T0, the
long-term payoff will be given in (24), shown at the bottom of
the page, where we have the following:
• The first and last terms
∑
i′∈S τi′i(S) represent the total
packet delivery rates achieved as if the player i is still in
the coalition.
• The second term τii({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i} τi′i(S) is the
packet delivery rate of deviating player i who deviates
without delivering packets for other innocent players plus
the total packet delivery rate from the innocent players in
the coalition.
• The third term τii({i}) represents the case in which the
players other than i punish the deviating player i (i.e.,
player i has to act alone and cannot join the coalition).
xDi (S) could be expressed in a closed form as in (25), shown
at the bottom of the next page.
Coalition S will be internally stable if the long-term payoff
achieved by every player when staying in the coalition is larger
than the one achieved when deviating, i.e., xi(S) > xDi (S) for
all i ∈ S . In this case, we can determine the minimum value
of the punishment duration T such that the internal stability
condition, as given in (26)–(28), shown at the bottom of the
next page, is satisfied.
Note that, in Appendix B, we also provide the analysis of the
internal stability condition for the trigger punishment scheme.
For external stability, the condition requires that all the play-
ers must gain higher long-term payoff by merging relative to the
case in which they do not merge, i.e., xi′(S) > xi′(S ∪ {i}) for
all i′ ∈ S and xi(S) > xi({i}).
D. Stochastic Model of Coalition Formation
To analyze the stable coalitions that can potentially form
between the DTN’s mobile nodes, we can apply a stochas-
tic modeling method based on a discrete-time Markov chain.
In particular, for the repeated coalition formation game, the
stochastic model will be an extension of the one introduced
in [30]. The state space of this Markov chain is defined as
Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψD(|N |)}, where ψ is the partition or coalition
structure. The partition is a set of coalitions of all players, i.e.,⋃
S∈ψ = N . D(n) is the Bell number [31], where n is the
number of players in the game. The Bell number is obtained
from
D(n) =
n−1∑
n′=0
(
n− 1
n′
)
D(n′), for n ≥ 1, and D(0) = 1.
(29)
Let Qψ,ψ′ denote the transition probability from partition ψ
to partition ψ′. We can derive the transition probability in two
cases, i.e., joining and deviating (i.e., splitting).
1) Joining: For a player i that is currently in a singleton
coalition (i.e., {i}), the probability that this player i will join
coalition S′ is
Qψ,ψ′ =
∏
i′∈S′∪{i}
βi′(ψ,ψ
′) (30)
for S′, {i} ∈ ψ, and S′ ∪ {i} ∈ ψ′, where βi′(ψ,ψ′) is the best
reply rule. The joining action will be successful if the singleton
coalition of player i is not externally stable and the existing
xDi (S) = (1 − δ)
〈
T0−1∑
t=0
δt
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
+ δT0
⎛
⎝τii ({i}) + ∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
⎞
⎠
+
T0+T∑
t=T0+1
δtτii ({i})
+
∞∑
t=T0+T+1
δt
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)〉
(24)
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players i′ in coalition S′ will not receive a lower long-term
payoffs if player i joins the coalition, i.e., xi′(S′ ∪ {i}) ≥
xi′(S′). Therefore, the best reply rule is defined as follows:
βi(ψ,ψ
′) =
{
βˆi
|ψ|−1 , xi (S′ ∪ {i}) > xi ({i})
, otherwise
(31)
βi′(ψ,ψ
′) =
{
βˆi′ , xi′ (S′ ∪ {i}) ≥ xi′(S′)
, otherwise
(32)
for i′ ∈ S′, where βˆi is a constant that represents the probability
that player i will perform the joining action, and  is a small
probability (e.g.,  = 10−5) that the player i will make an
irrational action (i.e., not joining the coalition even if it yields
higher long-term payoff). The denominator term |ψ| − 1 is the
number of possible coalitions that the player i can join in
partition ψ.
2) Deviating (Split): Assume that player i deviates from
coalition with a probability Qψ,ψ′ , for i ∈ S ∈ ψ and {i},S \
{i} ∈ ψ′. This deviation action will be successful if the coali-
tion is not internally stable or all the players in the coalitions,
except player i, can achieve a higher long-term payoff by
excluding player i from the coalition. In this case, the transition
probability is defined as follows:
Qψ,ψ′ = βi(ψ,ψ
′)
∏
i′∈S\{i}
βi′(ψ,ψ
′). (33)
In other words, if player i and the rest do not benefit from
staying in the same coalition, then either of them will deviate
and split from the coalition. The best reply rule here is defined
as follows:
βi(ψ,ψ
′) =
{
βˆi, x
D
i (S) > xi(S)
, otherwise
(34)
βi′(ψ,ψ
′) =
{
βˆi′ , xi′ (S \ {i}) > xi′(S)
, otherwise
(35)
for i, i′ ∈ S ∈ ψ, and {i},S \ {i} ∈ ψ′.
Note that, if the partition ψ′ is not reachable from partition ψ
via a joining or a deviating action, then we have the transition
probability Qψ,ψ′ = 0.
Let 	q = [qψ1 · · · qψ · · · qψD(|N|) ] denote a vector of sta-
tionary probability of the partitions. This vector can be obtained
xDi (S) = (1 − δ)δT0
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from deviation
− τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from cooperation
(1 − δT0 + δT0+T ) + τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
(δT0 − δT0+T )
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (25)
T > max
i
log
(
K1
K2
)
log δ
(26)
K1 =
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from cooperation
− τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from deviation
+ δ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from deviation
− τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (27)
K2 =
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from cooperation
− τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
(28)
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Fig. 4. Packet delivery rates of data sources 1 and 2 under different packet
generation rates of data source 2.
by solving 	qQ = 	q and 	q	1 = 1, where Q is the transition
probability matrix whose element is Qψ,ψ′ .
Let the probability of making an irrational action approach
zero (i.e.,  → 0). There could exist an ergodic set E ∈ Ψ of
states ψ if
∑
ψ′∈Ψ\EQψ,ψ′ = 0 for ψ ∈ E, and no nonempty
proper subset of E has this property. In this regard, the singleton
ergodic set is composed of absorbing states. In other words,
once all mobile nodes reach the state (i.e., the partition) in
the ergodic set, they will remain in this ergodic set forever.
Therefore, the players in the coalitions of the partitions in the
ergodic set do not have any incentive to join or deviate from the
coalitions. They can be viewed as stable coalitions.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Parameter Settings
We consider a DTN similar to the one shown in Fig. 2. There
are three data sources and three mobile nodes. Each mobile
node is assigned to collect data from its associated data source.
A mobile node can collect data from other data sources also if it
cooperates with others. Unless otherwise stated, the data source
generates a packet with probability 0.01. A mobile node has a
data queue of size of five packets and energy storage of size 100
units of energy. Each mobile node visits three data sources and
the gateways with identical probabilities. At the gateway, if a
mobile node requests a wireless energy transfer, it will receive
six units of energy from the gateway. However, if a mobile node
transmits a packet, two units of energy will be consumed. At the
data source, if a mobile node decides to accept a packet from the
data source, one unit of energy will be used. Each mobile node
transmits or receives a packet with the successful probability
of 0.99.
B. Numerical Results
1) Single Mobile Node Performance: Next, we evaluate the
packet delivery rate of two data sources, i.e., 1 and 2, when
their mobile nodes cooperate and do not cooperate. Fig. 4
shows the delivery rate when the packet generation probability
of data source 2 is varied, whereas that of data source 1 is
fixed at 0.01. When mobile nodes 1 and 2 do not cooperate,
the delivery rate of data source 1 remains constant and is not
Fig. 5. Delivery rates of data sources 1 and 2 under different delivery ratio
requirements of data source 1.
affected by the packet generation rate of data source 2. In
contrast, the delivery rate of data source 2 increases as its packet
generation probability increases. Nevertheless, when mobile
nodes 1 and 2 cooperate, we observe that the delivery rates
of both data sources are higher than the one achieved without
cooperation. However, while the delivery rate of data source 2
increases constantly, the delivery rate of data source 1 will
decrease. This is due to the fact that mobile node 1 must use
more of its resources (i.e., data queue and energy) to accept,
carry, and transmit the packets from data source 2. As a result,
mobile node 1 has fewer resources for delivering the packets
from its own data source 1. At a certain point (i.e., when the
packet generation probability of data source 2 is 0.067), the de-
livery rate of data source 1 with cooperation with data source 2
becomes lower than the one obtained in the case without
cooperation. In this case, node 1 will choose not to cooperate
with node 2.
In Fig. 5, we evaluate the impact of the packet blocking
probability requirement. This figure shows the delivery rates
of data sources 1 and 2, when the packet blocking probability
requirement of data source 1 is varied. By contrast, the data
source 2 does not have such a requirement. When the packet
blocking probability requirement of data source 1 decreases,
mobile node 1 must reserve its resources for delivering the
packets of data source 1. As a result, mobile node 1 accepts
fewer packets from data source 2; hence, the packet delivery
rate of data source 2 decreases. Without cooperation, the de-
livery rates of both data sources are not affected by the packet
blocking probability requirement. However, the delivery rates
are also always lower than those achieved with cooperation.
Note that the packet blocking probability requirement cannot be
decreased below 0.05 as it will result in an infeasible solution
for the optimization.
2) Cooperation Performance: We consider three types of
mobile nodes: one that cooperates, one that deviates from coop-
eration, and one that is punished. Fig. 6 shows the instantaneous
payoff of each mobile node that cooperates and forms a coali-
tion. Note that, in this case, for ease of explanation, we consider
identical mobile nodes whose instantaneous payoffs are the
same. In this figure, we consider three data sources in the same
coalition. Here, we observe that, if one of the mobile nodes
deviates from the coalition, this deviating node will achieve a
higher instantaneous payoff than by cooperating and staying in
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Fig. 6. Instantaneous payoffs of three mobile nodes: one that cooperates, one
that deviates from cooperation, and one that is punished.
Fig. 7. Long-term payoff of a mobile node under different punishment
periods.
the coalition. However, if this deviating node is punished, the
instantaneous payoff is the same as the payoff without cooper-
ation, which is lower than the one achieved when the mobile
node deviates or stays in the coalition. The differences between
these instantaneous payoffs will determine the incentive of any
mobile node to deviate and split from the coalition and the
punishment period that should be applied to that deviating node
so that the coalition can be stabilized.
Fig. 7 shows the long-term payoff of two mobile nodes, when
the time to deviate (T0) is varied. The discount factor is 0.9. We
observe that if the punishment period is one, this punishment,
applied to the deviating node, is not harsh enough (i.e., the
deviating node achieves a higher long-term payoff by deviating
rather than by cooperating). As a result, the mobile node will
deviate from the coalition. In contrast, if the punishment period
is two, the deviating node will experience a long-term payoff
lower than in the case of cooperation. Consequently, the mobile
node will not deviate. Clearly, the punishment period plays an
important role in the coalition formation.
In Fig. 8, we show the minimum punishment period required
to prevent the deviation of any mobile node in the network’s
coalitions. We consider two cases, i.e., two and three players.
First, we observe that, as the discount factor increases, the
minimum punishment period decreases. This is due to the
fact that a mobile node is concerned more about its future
payoff. Therefore, a severe punishment for deviation is no
longer required to incentivize the mobile nodes to cooperate.
Second, in a coalition having more mobile nodes (i.e., three
mobile nodes), the minimum punishment period can be larger
than that in a coalition having fewer mobile nodes (i.e., two
Fig. 8. Minimum punishment period to prevent deviation.
Fig. 9. Stable coalitions under different packet generation probabilities of data
sources 1 and 2, whereas that of data source 3 is fixed at 0.01.
mobile nodes). This stems from the fact that the deviating node
can gain more by taking advantage from more innocent nodes
in the coalition. Therefore, to prevent any mobile node from
deviating, the punishment must be severe enough.
Then, we evaluate the stable coalitions formed by three
mobile nodes. We fix the packet generation probability of data
source 3 to 0.01, whereas those of data sources 1 and 2 are
varied. The discount factor is set to 0.9, and the punishment
period is set to 2. Fig. 9 shows the stable coalitions, which
can be divided into different regions according to the packet
generation probabilities of data sources 1 and 2. The different
range of packet generation probabilities yields different stable
coalitions whose rationale is derived from Fig. 4. As discussed
for Fig. 4, the data source with a large packet generation
probability can overwhelm the mobile node of the data source
with a small packet generation probability. Therefore, a mobile
node serving the data source with a small packet generation
probability will not cooperate with the nodes serving the data
source with a large packet generation probability. Based on the
regions named A, B, C, D, E, and F in Fig. 9, we make the
following observations:
• Region A: In this region, the packet generation probabili-
ties of all the data sources are relatively small. Therefore,
all of them will tend to cooperate as none of them can take
advantage of other mobile nodes. Therefore, the stable
coalition is the grand coalition {1, 2, 3}.
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• Region B: In this region, the packet generation probabili-
ties of data sources 1 and 2 are much larger than that of
data source 3. Therefore, data source 3 will not cooperate
and form a coalition with data sources 1 and 2. In contrast,
data sources 1 and 2 can help each other as their packet
generation probabilities are not much different. Therefore,
the stable coalitions are {1, 2},{3}.
• Region C: In this region, data source 1 generates much
more packets than data sources 2 and 3. Therefore, mo-
bile nodes 2 and 3 will form a coalition (i.e., the stable
coalitions are {1},{2, 3}).
• Region D: Unlike Region C, in Region D, data source 2
generates much more packets than data sources 1 and 3.
Therefore, the stable coalitions are {1, 3},{2}.
• Region E: In this region, data source 1 generates much
more packets than data source 2, and they generate much
more packets than data source 3. Therefore, none of them
will cooperate, and the stable coalitions are all singleton
coalitions, i.e., {1},{2},{3}.
• Region F: Similar to Region E, data source 2 generates
much more packets than data source 1, and they gen-
erate much more packets than data source 3. Therefore,
none of them will cooperate, and the stable coalitions are
{1},{2},{3}.
From the above performance evaluation, we make the fol-
lowing important observations.
• A mobile node can choose a different action based on its
connectivity. If a mobile node is connected to the gateway,
this node can either transmit the packet waiting in its data
queue or request wireless energy transfer to fill its energy
storage. This action depends on the current number of
packets in the queue and on the energy level of the energy
storage. If a mobile node is connected with a data source,
the node will accept the packet from this data source
based on the packet blocking probability requirement. For
example, a mobile node can accept most of the packets
from its own data source while selectively accepting the
packets from other data sources.
• The system parameters (e.g., packet generation rate) can
affect the packet delivery rate of the mobile nodes. This
impact is very important, particularly when the mobile
nodes cooperate to deliver packets for each other’s data
sources. There exists a chance that the mobile nodes will
not cooperate if their data sources generate packets with
significantly different rates. The resources of a mobile
node, in terms of queue space and energy, can be over-
whelmed by the data source with high packet generation
rate.
• Although mobile nodes can decide to cooperate and form a
coalition, some selfish nodes may take advantage of other
innocent nodes and quietly deviate from the coalition.
Such selfish nodes instantaneously gain the benefit of the
other nodes’ help without reciprocating this help.
• The innocent nodes can punish a deviating node by not
helping it. The punishment period can be adjusted to
ensure that none of the nodes has an incentive to deviate.
• The stable coalitions can be determined, depending on the
packet generation rate. The proposed analytical and opti-
mization model for the packet delivery service in DTNs
and the repeated coalition formation game model can be
applied to analyze these stable coalitions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered a DTN whose mobile nodes
seek to collect packets from their associated data sources and
deliver them to a sink (i.e., a gateway). In such a network, the
mobile nodes can harvest wireless energy transferred from the
gateway. The mobile nodes can also cooperate to help collect
the packets from each other’s data sources. We have addressed
two major issues in such a network. First, we have formulated
an optimization model to derive the optimal policy for each
mobile node. This optimal policy determines whether a mobile
node will accept a packet from the data source or not and
whether it will request wireless energy transfer or, instead,
transmit its packet to the gateway. The objective is to maximize
the delivery rate of the packets from data sources, given that
the packet blocking probability requirement is met. Second,
we have introduced a repeated coalition formation game model
to capture the cooperation strategies of the mobile nodes. In
this game, the mobile nodes decide to help each other based
on the long-term payoff rather than the instantaneous payoff.
The long-term payoff depends on deviations and punishments.
We have provided extensive performance evaluation that clearly
showed the benefits of the proposed framework and the proper-
ties of the stable coalitions that can potentially form in a DTN.
For future work, we will consider multihop communication
between multiple mobile nodes. Moreover, the deviation of
multiple nodes from a coalition will be analyzed.
APPENDIX A
TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX
We derive the transition probability matrix for the CMDP op-
timization model. There are three major steps. First, we derive
the energy state transition matrix for all four actions. Then, this
energy state transition matrix is used to construct the transition
matrix with queue state transition. Finally, the transition matrix
of the energy and queue states is used to construct the transition
matrix with location transition for all actions.
Step 1: Energy State Transition
If a mobile node is at a location having a gateway, and it
decides to request wireless energy transfer, the energy level of
its energy storage will increase by K units and be bounded by
the energy storage capacity B. Let BK denote the probability
matrix of this case. It can be expressed as follows:
BK =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 · · · 1
.
.
.
1
.
.
.
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
← b = 0
.
.
.
← b = B −K
.
.
.
← b = B
. (36)
In contrast, if a mobile node transmits a packet to the gateway
when the energy level is higher than or equal to J , the energy
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level will decrease by J units. Otherwise, the energy level will
remain the same. Let BJ denote the probability matrix of this
case. It can be expressed as follows:
BJ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
.
.
.
1
1
.
.
.
1 · · · 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
← b = 0
.
.
.
← b = J − 1
← b = J
.
.
.
← b = B.
(37)
Similarly, if a mobile node receives a packet from a data source
when the energy level is higher than or equal to Jˆ , the energy
level will decrease by Jˆ units. Otherwise, the energy level will
remain the same. This transition matrix is denoted BJˆ , which
is similar to BJ , except that the energy level decreases by Jˆ at
row b = Jˆ . Therefore, we omit showing this matrix for brevity.
Finally, if the mobile node remains idle, the energy level will
remain the same. Therefore, the transition matrix is basically
an identity matrix I.
Step 2: Queue State Transition
Then, we combine energy state and queue state transitions.
If a mobile node is at a location with a gateway and the node
decides to transmit a packet, then the number of packets may
decrease, and the energy level decreases by J units. Let Q−
denote the transition matrix of this case. It can be expressed as
follows:
Q− =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
I
TsBJ T
uBJ
.
.
.
.
.
.
TsBJ T
uBJ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
← q = 0
← q = 1
.
.
.
← q = Q
(38)
where Ts and Tu are the probability matrices of successful and
unsuccessful packet transmission to the gateway, respectively.
The elements of Ts and Tu at row b and column b′, which
correspond to the energy levels, are denoted by T sb,b′ and Tub,b′ ,
and they are obtained from
T sb,b′ =
{
μ, J ≤ b = b′ ≤ B
0, otherwise (39)
Tub,b′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, 0 ≤ b = b′ < J
1 − μ, J ≤ b = b′ ≤ B
0, otherwise
(40)
for b = 0, 1, . . . , B. In this case, if a mobile node has an energy
level less than J , it cannot transmit a packet; hence, the number
of packets in the queue remains the same (i.e., the case 0 ≤ b =
b′ < J of Tub,b). Otherwise, the number of packets will decrease
by one with the probability of μ, which is the successful packet
transmission probability (i.e., the case J ≤ b = b′ ≤ B of Tub,b).
If a mobile node is at a location with a data source, and this
node decides to accept a packet from the data source, then the
number of packets may increase, and the energy level decreases
by Jˆ units. Let Q+ denote the transition matrix of this case. It
can be expressed as follows:
Q+ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1 − α)BJˆ αBJˆ
.
.
.
.
.
.
(1 − α)BJˆ αBJˆ
I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
← q = 0
.
.
.
← q = Q− 1
← q = Q
(41)
where α is the probability of packet arrival at the mobile node
from the data source.
If a mobile node requests for wireless energy transfer from
the gateway, the number of packets remains the same, and the
energy level increases by K units. Let Qo denote the transition
matrix of this case. It can be expressed as follows:
Qo =
⎡
⎣BK . .
.
BK
⎤
⎦ . (42)
If a mobile node decides to do nothing, there is no change
for the queue and energy states. Therefore, the transition matrix
is basically the identity matrix I with the size of (Q+ 1)(B +
1)× (Q+ 1)(B + 1).
Step 3: Location State Transition
Next, we combine the location state with the energy and
queue state transitions. The transition probability matrix is
denoted as P(ω) for action ω. For the action ω = 0 (i.e., the
mobile node does nothing), the transition matrix is denoted by
P(0) whose element is ml,l′I, where I is the identity matrix
with the size of (Q+ 1)(B + 1)× (Q+ 1)(B + 1). This indi-
cates that there is no change to the queue and energy states.
For the action ω = 1 (i.e., the mobile node requests for wire-
less energy transfer from the gateway), the transition matrix
P(1) has the element of ml,l′Qo for l ∈ LG (i.e., the mobile
node must be at the location with the gateway so that the energy
level can increase by K units). Otherwise, the element of P(1)
is ml,l′I for l ∈ LG.
For the action ω = 2 (i.e., the mobile node transmits a packet
to the gateway), the transition matrix P(2) has the element
of ml,l′Q− for l ∈ LG (i.e., the mobile node must be at the
location with the gateway so that it can transmit a packet).
Otherwise, the element of P(2) is ml,l′I for l ∈ LG.
For the action ω = 3 (i.e., the mobile node receives a packet
from the data source), the transition matrix P(3) has the ele-
ment of ml,l′Q+ for l ∈ LS (i.e., the mobile node must be at
the location with the data source so that it can accept a packet).
Otherwise, the element of P(3) is ml,l′I for l ∈ LS .
APPENDIX B
TRIGGER PUNISHMENT SCHEME
We can consider the trigger punishment scheme for the
players who deviate from a coalition. Again, for the internal
stability, we assume that one player may deviate at a time.
The condition for internal stability of the coalition S is that
xi(S) > xi({i}) for all i ∈ S . The long-term payoff when the
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xDi (S) = (1 − δ)
〈
T0−1∑
t=0
δt
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
+ δT0
⎛
⎝τii ({i}) + ∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
⎞
⎠
+
∞∑
t=T0+1
δtτii ({i})
〉
(43)
xDi (S) = (1 − δ)δT0
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i}
τi′i(S)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from deviation
− τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
(∑
i′∈S
τi′i(S)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ from cooperation
(1 − δT0) + τii ({i})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Payoﬀ under punishment
δT0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (44)
player i and other players are in the coalition S can be obtained
from (23). If the player i deviates from the coalition S at time
period T0, the long-term payoff will be as in (43), which can be
expressed in a closed form, as shown at the top of the page.
The coalition S will be internally stable if the long-term pay-
off of staying in the coalition is larger than that of deviation, i.e.,
xi(S) > xDi (S) for all i ∈ S . In this case, we can determine the
minimum value of the discount factor δ such that the internal
stability condition is met. The condition is
δ >
τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i} τi′i(S)−
∑
i′∈S τi′i(S)
τii ({i}) +
∑
i′∈S\{i} τi′i(S)− τii ({i})
. (45)
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